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BUILDING HAPPINESS INDICATORS
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES
XAVIER LANDES
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
DEPARTMENT OF MEDIA, COGNITION AND COMMUNICATION, UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN
ABSTRACT:
Happiness has become a central theme in public debates. Happiness indicators illustrate
this importance. This article offers a typology of the main challenges conveyed by the
elaboration of happiness indicators, where happiness can be understood as hedonia,
subjective well-being, or eudaimonia. The typology is structured around four questions:
(1)what to measure?—i.e., the difficulties linked to the choice of a particular understan-
ding of happiness for building an indicator; (2) whom to include?—i.e., the limits of the
community monitored by such an indicator; (3) how to collect the data?—i.e., the diffi-
culties stemming from objective and subjective reporting; (4) what to do?—i.e., the
concerns about the use of happiness indicators in public policy. The major points of
normative contention are discussed for each of these dimensions. The purpose of this
article is to contribute in a constructive manner to happiness research by offering an
overview of somemajor philosophical and political challenges of building happiness indi-
cators. The conclusion underlines the importance of the strategy of diversification-
hybridization,which consists in setting a variety of indicators or composite indicators that
articulate different understandings of happiness. It is stressed that happiness indicators
raise democratic and institutional issues with which normative thinkers should deal.
RÉSUMÉ :
Le bonheur est devenu un thème central dans les débats publics. Les indicateurs de
bonheur illustrent cette importance.Cet article offre une typologie des principaux enjeux
contenus dans le travail d’élaboration d’indicateurs de bonheur quand ce dernier est
compris comme hedonia, bien-être subjectif ou eudaimonia. La typologie est structurée
autour de quatre questions : 1) que mesurer?, où sont en jeu les difficultés liées au choix
d’une compréhension particulière du bonheur pour construire un indicateur; 2) qui
inclure?, c’est-à-dire comment tracer les limites de la communauté morale qui est l’objet
d’un tel indicateur; 3) comment collecter les données?, où on interroge les difficultés
propres aux techniques subjectives et objectives de collecte de données; 4) que faire?, où
on soulève l’enjeu des craintes quant à l’usage d’indicateurs de bonheur dans les poli-
tiques publiques. Les points majeurs de dispute normative sont discutés pour chaque
dimension. Nous espérons ainsi contribuer de manière constructive à la recherche sur le
bonheur en offrant un aperçu de quelques défis philosophiques et politiques majeurs
relatifs à la construction d’indicateurs de bonheur. Nous concluons en soulignant l’im-
portance de la stratégie de diversification-hybridation qui consiste àmettre en place des
indicateurs variés ou composites articulant différentes compréhensions du bonheur. Ces
indicateurs soulèvent des enjeux démocratiques et institutionnels que les penseurs
normatifs doivent considérer.
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Over the last decades, happiness has received increased attention. Psychologists
have been investigating understandings1 (Biswas-Diener et al., 2009; Kashdan et
al., 2008; Keyes andAnnas, 2009;Waterman, 2008) and determinants of happi-
ness (Diener and Seligman, 2004). Positive psychology (a branch of eudaimo-
nia) has elaborated on “authentic happiness” (Seligman, 2002) while researchers
like Daniel Kahneman (1999) coined “objective happiness,” a modern version
of Benthamian hedonia. The Easterlin Paradox2 has been intensely studied and
debated (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Easterlin et al., 2010;
Graham, 2009; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). Finally, philosophers have been
discussing the foundations of various understandings of happiness and the rela-
tionship between happiness and well-being (e.g., Annas, 1993; Haybron, 2010;
Kraut, 1979; Sumner, 1996).
Public decision-making is affected too. Researchers advocate for national and
international measures of happiness (e.g. Diener, 2000; J. F. Helliwell and
Barrington-Leigh, 2010; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Kahneman et al., 2004a;
Krueger, 2009). Political decision-makers have increasingly become receptive
to the idea of creating happiness indicators. International organisations lobby
for reforming existing indicators or elaborating new ones that include happiness
(e.g., United Nations). Happiness (often understood as subjective well-being) is
on the agenda of local and central governments too (Saamah et al., 2012, p. 3).
Some already have or will soon have their own happiness indexes—including
Bhutan, southern Denmark, Canada (unofficially), the city Somerville in United
States, United Kingdom, and Japan—while other governments consider devel-
oping such tools (Stiglitz et al., 2009).
This increased attention appeals to a normative evaluation because social indi-
cators have deep moral and political underpinnings and implications, in partic-
ular when implemented by public institutions.3 There is a need for an analytical
overview of the philosophical and political challenges. Political philosophy and
public ethics have not so far proposed an encompassing overview of these chal-
lenges.
This article represents such an attempt. It reviews some of the main questions
that happiness indicators raise, organized in a taxonomy (see the table below);
the criticisms that can be lodged against happiness indicators; and replies that can
be opposed to these criticisms. The taxonomy is structured along four categories:
The first includes questions about which understanding of happiness should be
measured? The second relates to the population that should be monitored: whose
happiness to measure? The third gathers methodological questions about the
construction of these indicators: how to elaborate such an index? The last cate-
gory is about the use of indicators by public institutions: how to apply happiness
indicators?
By evaluating the construction and use of diverse happiness indicators, this arti-
cle neither endorses happiness as the ultimate goal of life, the definitive metric
of justice, nor assumes that happiness research and some of its political
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outcomes cannot be challenged at a foundational level (e.g., as being a contro-
versial conception of welfare). In this article I review some philosophical and
political issues raised by happiness indicators. The methodology is to take seri-
ously the diversity of indicators that are or could be proposed by researchers and
institutions. The point is not to discuss happiness as a philosophical concept or
to defend the politics of happiness. It is simply to provide a normative evalua-
tion of happiness measurement when carried on by public institutions.
The originality of this work in public ethics is that it covers the main issues about
building happiness indicators, the debates they generate, and the possible replies
that could be framed in good faith and with close attention to happiness research.
Furthermore, it highlights the importance of the strategy of diversification-
hybridization. Indeed, it is shown that most worries about happiness indicators
(e.g., moral/epistemological partiality) can be deflected by building composite
indicators (i.e., indicators including several understandings of happiness) or by
favouring the elaboration of various indicators for capturing the complexity of
human happiness. The conclusion recaps challenges that are of interest for
normative thinkers, in particular on democratic grounds. It also presses the point
that attention from normative thinkers is required even more now that the process
of diversification-hybridization is already being discussed in social sciences and
is a reality of public decision-making.
1.WHAT TOMEASURE?
When building happiness indicators, the first step is to identify the basis of the
indicators, i.e. the type of happiness that is being analyzed. This step is impor-
tant because it may express underlying political choices and commitments. Thus
the first section introduces us to (1.1) the three understandings of happiness
available for building indicators, (1.2) the proper characterization of happiness,
(1.3) the broad philosophical issues such indicators raise, (1.3) the two-pronged
criticism of political or epistemological partiality that could be brought against
either hedonia or eudaimonia, and (1.4) the issues proper to indicators based on
subjective well-being.
1.1WHICH HAPPINESS?
In the literature, there are three main understandings of happiness: hedonia,
eudaimonia, and subjective well-being (SWB).4 Each articulates two interre-
lated dimensions: a descriptive one (Happiness is X or Y) and a normative one
(Happiness as X or Y is good because of A or B). They are interrelated in the
sense that the normative value is rooted in the descriptive dimension (e.g., hedo-
nia is good because pleasures or positive emotions are good things for human
welfare, eudaimonia is good because flourishing or functioning well is a good
thing for human welfare, etc.).
Hedonia is an affair of affects (or sometimes emotions (Diener, 1984; Diener et
al., 1999), even if the hedonic nature of emotions might be disputed). An indi-
vidual is happy to the extent that he or she is “feeling” happy, i.e., that individ-
ual is experiencing positive affects. And, overall, a life may be called qualified
as “happy” in the hedonic sense if the balance between positive and negative
affects is positive. The World Happiness Report defines it as “affective happi-
ness” (Sachs, 2012, p. 6).Authors such as Jeremy Bentham, Francis Edgeworth,
and Daniel Kahneman are representative of this understanding.
The second understanding, subjective well-being (SWB hereafter), has three
components: positive affects, negative affects, and life satisfaction (Pavot, 2008).
Positive and negative affects are hedonic whereas life satisfaction is of a differ-
ent nature, implying self-assessment (poll respondents judge their whole life or
life domains such as work, family, social relations, etc.). The World Happiness
Report characterizes this form as “evaluative” (Sachs, 2012, p. 6) because
respondents are required “to make a retrospective judgment about how their
lives are going overall” (Tiberius, 2006). SWB, especially the life satisfaction
component, is widely used for national and international surveys and popular
among psychologists (e.g., Ed Diener), heterodox economists (e.g., Richard
Easterlin, Bruno Frey) and philosophers (e.g., Wayne Sumner).
The third understanding, eudaimonia, identifies happiness with the development
of personal faculties. An individual is happy in the eudaimonic sense to the
extent that he or she is virtuous (Aristotle), functions well—rather than simply
“feels” good—(Keyes andAnnas, 2009), is self-determined (Ryan et al., 2008),
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or is personally expressive (Waterman, 1993). So “happiness is something like
flourishing human living, a kind of living that is active, inclusive of all that has
intrinsic value, and complete, meaning lacking in nothing that would make it
richer or better” (Nussbaum, 2005, p. 171). Despite notable differences, eudai-
monic views share a common idea: an “happy” life consists in the actualization
of individuals’ potential that could be related to morality (e.g., virtues in Aris-
totle), agency (e.g., capabilities), intellectual capacities (like in John Stuart Mill),
flourishing, etc. Psychologists (e.g., Carol Ryff, Martin Seligman, Alan Water-
man), philosophers (e.g., JuliaAnnas, Martha Nussbaum) and economists (e.g.,
Amartya Sen) have discussed this understanding.
A last, important, point: one may deny that eudaimonia is about happiness by
claiming, for instance, that eudaimonia is about well-being, assuming that happi-
ness and well-being are two different things. There are several ways of making
sense of the distinction. A common way is to postulate that happiness is about
psychological states whereas eudaimonia is not. The problem is that there are
eudaimonic conceptions that are subjective (Kraut, 1979), or contain a strong
psychological dimension (e.g., Waterman’s personal expressiveness, Singer and
Ryff’s psychological well-being, Nussbaum’s view on eudaimonia). One may
acknowledge this, but maintain the point that eudaimonia is something else than
“happiness” (in a sense that often is unclear).
To this, it can be replied that happiness is a continuum ranging from feeling to
functioning well, a continuum that expresses the deeper idea that the life is going
well according to the individuals themselves. To some extent, this is the
complexity that SWB tries to capture by combining affective and evaluative
dimensions. Hedonists may contest the label of “true happiness” to eudaimonia
and eudaimonists may do the same with hedonia. These controversies express
something common in philosophy and beyond: interpretative conflicts about the
true nature of values and principles. This article adopts a neutral posture on
the true nature of happiness in order to present a structured overview of the
challenges faced by all types of indicators that monitor happiness as understood
in its diversity defined by many philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and
economists.
1.2 CONCEPTS, CONCEPTIONS, AND UNDERSTANDINGS
But before going any further it is worth to ask a simple but fundamental question:
what are hedonia, SWB, and eudaimonia? Are they “forms,” “types,” “kinds,”
“dimensions,” “conceptions,” “concepts,” of happiness or something else?
Apossibility is that hedonia, eudaimonia and SWB are conceptions of happiness:
there would be a concept (happiness) that would receive different interpreta-
tions (conceptions). This concept would exist independently of any particular
interpretation. A problem with this view is that if hedonia, SWB and eudaimo-
nia expresses a common idea, it might not be a single, unified, concept.
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A second possibility is that hedonia, SWB, and eudaimonia are different
concepts (Haybron, 2010, p. 31). Hedonia would be a subjective feeling (i.e., a
psychological state) while eudaimonia would be an objective manner of being
or functioning and SWB the combination of affective and evaluative conditions.
A variant is to posit that hedonia is about happiness and eudaimonia about well-
being. This view has the merit of simplicity, but this simplicity is misleading.As
stated, some eudaimonic conceptions are subjective or rooted in specific psycho-
logical states. Also, SWB is not a self-standing concept; it is a construct made
of hedonic components (affects) and life satisfaction (individuals’ judgment on
their life).
The purpose of this article is not to reach the truth about happiness, but to review
public policy issues raised by happiness indicators. We therefore need to find a
characterization of hedonia, SWB, and eudaimonia that serves this purpose. In
this article I chose the term of understandings. The word has the merit of accom-
modating the opposite view of hedonia, eudaimonia, and SWB as conceptions
and concepts. Its encompassing nature leaves room for a general overview of
public policy issues conveyed by happiness indicators. This choice might be
tackled as accepting the terminology framed by happiness researchers and any
ensuing confusion.
One might also deny any relevance to happiness research as such or consider that
social scientists are so confused about the “essence” or true nature of happiness
that they end up talking about different things. These criticisms call for two
comments.
Firstly, the confusion that would reign in happiness research is sometimes exag-
gerated. The fact that different authors have different understandings of happiness
does not mean that the whole research is crippled by confusion. An analogy is
useful: the fact that philosophers mobilize different understandings of equality
(e.g., in regard to the metric, to the rule of distribution, etc.) does not imply that
equality as an object of philosophical investigation is crippled by confusion.
Secondly, the criticism would be fair if researchers never defined their object or
if they disregarded the diverse uses of “happiness”. But, on the one hand, most
researchers are clear on their understanding, how it is constructed, how it differs
from other understandings. On the other hand, they are also clear on the diver-
sity that exists within their field as illustrated by various debates (Biswas-Diener
et al., 2009; Kahneman, 1999; Kahneman et al., 1997; Kashdan et al., 2008;
Keyes and Annas, 2009; Pavot, 2008; Waterman, 1993, 2008).
For a moral thinker interested in public policies, the challenge is precisely to
offer a structured view of the philosophical and political issues of building indi-
cators of happiness in its diversity. In other words, it is to adopt a pluralistic and
neutral view on happiness when dealing with public ethics issues.
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1.3 BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
The choice of an understanding by researchers and public institutions is funda-
mental. Depending on this choice, a given index will emphasize dimensions of
well-being at the expense of others (with the limit that no understanding of
happiness is exhaustive of welfare), which will affect the feed-back that institu-
tions receive. The choice raises two main challenges: the respect for pluralism
and the nature of “true” happiness.
a) Respect for pluralism. Despite significant overlaps, citizens do not share iden-
tical moral, religious, or cultural views. Individual opinions diverge on what
constitutes the good life, even if this divergence is often overstated. Therefore,
institutions need to pick an understanding of happiness that can accommodate
different conceptions of the good life. Because hedonia, SWB, and eudaimonia
are never purely descriptive when used in the public realm (they are measured,
compiled, monitored for political purposes ranging frommonitoring to decision-
making), the normative charge that indicators are carrying should be compati-
ble with most of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines endorsed by
individuals.
Axiological diversity is an issue. But diversity also has a cultural dimension.
Understandings of happiness may vary depending on cultural membership
(Vazquez and Hervas, 2013, pp. 33-34). People may also weight components
(e.g. positive or negative affects) or understandings (e.g., hedonia, eudaimonia)
differently (Diener, 2009). Recognizing pluralism when building happiness indi-
cators is an acute issue for any society as well as for international comparisons.
b) Nature of “true” happiness. There is also a question as to which understand-
ing most closely matches “true,” “authentic,” “real,” or “veritable” happiness
(if such a thing exists, which is controversial in itself), and not something illu-
sory or delusive.
If we start with hedonia, this understanding is often criticized for giving an unre-
fined or partial and, as a result, unappealing view of human well-being (Alexan-
drova, 2005; Haybron, 2010). This is either because a life structured around
hedonistic goals is intrinsically undesirable or because hedonia leads to unde-
sirable outcomes such as the pursuit of short-term pleasures at the expense of
lasting satisfaction or self-flourishing. There is a further criticism. Hedonia is
accused of being an indiscriminate theory that does not (cannot) discriminate
pleasures according to their moral content (Nussbaum, 2010). A pleasure will
remain a pleasure, no matter if it results from sadistic or antisocial behaviour.
If hedonia is endorsed by the state, through an indicator, as (part of) what has
value in life (i.e., as (part of) the good life), lifestyles based on temporary, imme-
diate, or even immoral pleasures might be promoted at the expense of more
ambitious and fulfilling life paths. This leads to two broader criticisms, which
indiscriminately apply to hedonia and eudaimonia.
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According to the neutralist critique, it is objectionable for the public to endorse
any comprehensive doctrine, independently of the fact that this doctrine is hedo-
nic or eudaimonic. A partisan critic argues that when institutions adopt hedonic
indicators, they endorse an inferior moral view (hedonia) at the expense of a
preferable alternative (eudaimonia or SWB).
However, in cases where hedonia is adopted for some indicators without any
further public endorsement, it is possible to argue that a moral ideal is not being
promoted as such. But the choice of hedonia as the baseline of an index may
still distort the feedback received since other important components of well-
being are not taken into account.
1.4 POLITICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARTIALITY
This criticism of partiality, either political—the public commitment to a specific
interpretation of the good life—or epistemological—the construction of biased
indices—, can also be addressed to eudaimonia.
In regard to political partiality, the objection is that eudaimonia expresses a
perfectionist view. If happiness lies in the development of human capacities,
which could be understood as the highest intellectual abilities (as expressed by
Aristotle and John Stuart Mill), eudaimonia could also be criticized for being
biased in favour of a particular conception of the good life (Landes 2013).
Not all eudaimonic understandings are equally vulnerable to this criticism.
Objective understandings based on a predefined list of precise items classified
in a moral hierarchy are particularly vulnerable, contrary to understandings
focusing on general human traits or abilities that are not overly specific. For
example, the capability approach emphasizes general human functioning (e.g.,
a self-sufficient, socially integrated, individual life) rather than specific func-
tioning (Nussbaum, 1992; Sen, 1999). Another example of a not-so-vulnerable
understanding is Self-Determination Theory, which grounds eudaimonia as
psychological well-being in individual autonomy and intrinsic motivation (Ryan
et al., 2008).
As regards epistemological partiality, eudaimonic indexes can be criticized for
disregarding the affective aspect of happiness (as well-being): if they are based
on eudaimonia alone, the indexes will provide a partial view of the actual well-
being of a given population. They will leave out of the picture presumably
important elements for living a happy life (e.g., positive feelings such as pleas-
ure or joy).
Both hedonic and eudaimonic supporters may reply by asserting the epistemic
and/or moral superiority of either hedonia or eudaimonia. The difficulty with this
response is for hedonia supporters to dismiss eudaimonia (and vice-versa) they
must prove that the life aspects that the other theory encompasses do not contribute
to happiness in any reasonable sense. If it is shown that pleasures/pains or flour-
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ishing/functioning are part of widespread understandings of happiness, it becomes
difficult to exclude them from the construction of an indicator that attempts to
measure the happiness of a population. The reason is that individuals themselves
assess their condition by appealing to these understandings.
1.5 SUBJECTIVEWELL-BEING ANDDIVERSIFICATION-
HYBRIDIZATION
One strategy for avoiding this difficulty is to combine elements of hedonia and
eudaimonia into a single index. Even if SWB does not include eudaimonic
components per se (Ryan and Deci, 2001), it partially adopts this strategy of
diversification (by referring to the different understandings that might be sepa-
rately accounted for in an indicator or a set of indicators) or hybridization (by
referring to the creation of a composite indicator drawing on different under-
standings) (Diener, 2000).5 Because SWB is made of positive affects, negative
affects, and life satisfaction,it contains affective and evaluative aspects. There-
fore, an indicator based on SWB is more resistant to the partiality objection
(without completely deflecting the criticism). This versatility has contributed to
the popularity of SWB among researchers who work on indexes (Diener and
Seligman, 2004).
Since SWB tracks both affective and evaluative dimensions, it is less vulnera-
ble to the partiality objection. Yet reservations have been raised about SWB’s
capacity to capture adequately culturally diverse understandings of happiness
(e.g., the valorization of negative affects and de-valorization of positive affects,
the lesser emphasis on the importance of self-evaluation in certain cultures
(Diener, 2000)). The problem is that SWB components are measured by requir-
ing individuals to reply to questions (“are you satisfied with your life?,” “are
you satisfied with your work/family/social relations?”) or to provide a cardinal
evaluation (“how depressed / elated / etc. do you feel?” on a 0 to 3 scale for
instance) that can be interpreted differently according to respondents’ cultural
backgrounds. This might be a problem for a national index since it leads to
aggregate data that does not have the same content (and meaning) in different
places and populations.
For international comparisons, the problem is twofold: the same indicator
applied to different countries may not measure the same thing because people
may interpret the questions differently depending on their culture and, therefore,
the answers cannot be compared. Individuals may also value the diverse domains
or emotions under evaluation differently. Some data may appear, at first sight,
negative or positive, whereas they are not intended as such by respondents,
which undermines international comparisons and can render interpretations diffi-
cult. For instance, certain negative affects are positively valued in Eastern
cultures while certain positive affects are despised (Diener, 2000, p. 39).
Partiality is the main criticism made against happiness indexes based only on
either hedonia or eudaimonia. Researchers usually address this objection by
12
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using or invoking the potential diversification-hybridization of indicators, by
employing SWBmeasurements or other composite indicators (e.g., the Pember-
ton Happiness Index, which tracks positive affects, negative affects, general
well-being, eudaimonic well-being, hedonic well-being, and social well-being
(Vazquez and Hervas, 2013)). In other terms, the combination of different
elements, which capture different understandings of happiness, make the partial-
ity criticism less convincing by rendering indicators more encompassing.6
Like other composite indicators, SWB may deflect most of the criticisms in
relation to partiality. However, they still face a shortcoming. They do not account
for functioning, flourishing, or individual capabilities. But it is far from being a
fatal defect since other, eudaimonic, components may be added up to a given
indicator or used to supplement the information given by SWB. Thus happiness
research has internal resources for turning happiness indicators into less partial
indicators.
A final criticism regards the supposedly monstrous nature of hybrid-diversified
indicators. One may claim that they compile unrelated elements (e.g., affects,
self-assessment, flourishing) for creating a chimer. On theoretical grounds, it
might be the case: hybrid-diversified indicators might be judged monstrous since
they blur “some” boundaries between understandings of happiness. Practically,
it is another matter. On political grounds, it is difficult to grasp the monstrous
nature of hybrid-diversified indicators and see in it a problem for public policy.
Public monitoring and decision-making continuously rely on composite indica-
tors (e.g., UN Human Development Index, OECD Better Life Index). If the goal
of indicators is not to say the truth of happiness, but to inform public policies on
some, complex and multilayered, aspects of human welfare, then theoretical
monstrosity is no defect. To the contrary, it might constitute an advantage.
Furthermore, if designers and public users of these indicators are aware of their
composite structure and the nature of the various components, it is difficult to
see what kind of monstrosity it could be.
2.WHOMTO INCLUDE?
In this section we deal only briefly with the scope of happiness indexes: whom
to include? The topic is not unimportant, but it raises issues that go beyond the
scope of this paper—i.e., the inclusion of three specific groups—residents/citi-
zens, non-human animals, and future generations. Although this is only a quick
overview of this issue, it should be stressed that researchers and public institu-
tions need to identify the population(s) they wish to survey (which implies
providing justifications) when they construct and implement an index. For
national indicators, the choice has practical and moral implications because it
expresses an underlying view about the limits of the moral community, under-
stood as the community whose interests are taken into account even if happiness
indicators do not offer a complete and definitive view on welfare and, so, might
be completed by other indicators.
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2.1 MEMBERSHIP SCOPE
Should national indicators measure the happiness of citizens, legal residents, or
anyone present on the territory regardless of status (Durand and Smith, 2013,
p. 120)? This question might seem rhetorical since, in practice, most existing
indicators and surveys do not discriminate among people on the basis of their
immigration and citizenship situation. But the question is still relevant since
institutions may have an interest in monitoring different populations separately.
In addition, when international studies claim, for instance, that Swiss are the
happiest people in the world (J. Helliwell et al., 2015, p. 26), is it really about
Swiss citizens or about residents in Switzerland? The question is both political
and epistemological.
Furthermore, public institutions may have difficulties collecting data from vari-
ous population categories. For instance, illegal refugees usually do not appear on
national statistical database (and so are not picked by large-scale surveys that use
such databases) or prefer to remain invisible for obvious reasons.Another exam-
ple is homeless or migrant people who may not appear in happiness indicators
because they do not have a constant residence. It is a shortcoming because happi-
ness indicators ought to monitor the well-being of these groups (except if deci-
sion-makers consider these groups as socially unimportant and their well-being
as morally irrelevant).
On moral grounds, if the well-being of these groups is not monitored, there is a
risk of accentuating some of the vulnerabilities they face by reducing their social
visibility and, as a consequence, their political weight. In short, is a national
index only about the happiness of the nationals, the legal residents, all the resi-
dents whoever they are, or only the residents with a fixed address (excluding
for instance homeless people)?
Also, should different populations be aggregated in a single index or monitored
through different indexes? This question implicitly raises the diversity issue
discussed above. If members of cultural minorities understand hedonia or eudai-
monia differently or value SWB components differently (e.g., the value of nega-
tive vs. positive affects), it will affect the happiness index. In short, national
indexes will aggregate material that is not understood in the same way or data
that does not refer to the same psychological or objective conditions. Conse-
quently, the salience of happiness indicators will be diminished.
2.2 GENERATION SCOPE
This question could be summarized as follows: should future generations be
included in a happiness index (Brülde, 2010, p. 572)? The inclusion of non-
existing individuals echoes a series of discussions in the field of intergenera-
tional justice that are not addressed in these pages. But, generally speaking, if we
agree on the very general principle that happiness of future generations is
morally relevant, the issue is how to calculate such happiness and integrate it into
an indicator that also tracks the situation of existing generations.
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This question contains three aspects. The first aspect is moral. It is about combin-
ing the happiness of different generations in a single index—i.e., what relative
weight to give to existing and future people. Grouping the well-being of several
generations in a single index (or combining several indexes) raises technical
issues too, the most important being the appropriate discount rate to be imposed
on the (potential) happiness of future generations. The third aspect is epistemo-
logical: is happiness the same when we consider actual or future individuals?Are
we comparing the same thing? This question will presumably grow in impor-
tance as sustainability becomes a primary goal of institutions and as we increas-
ingly rely on happiness and well-being indexes.
2.3 SPECIES SCOPE
Should non-human animals be included in happiness indexes (Brülde, 2010,
p. 572)? It may be argued that, in order to be exhaustive, happiness indexes
should include non-human animals. Or the argument can be more moral in the
sense that excluding non-human animals cannot be justified on moral grounds.
A quick glance over the literature may suggest that some understandings of
happiness are better suited than others for applying to animals. By claiming that
happiness is reducible to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain, clas-
sical hedonism, for example, offers an analytical framework that seems readily
applicable to non-human animals (especially if no distinction is made in regard
to the nature or quality of pleasures (Crisp, 1998, pp. 9-13)).
Another aspect of the issue is that researchers and institutions may favour some
understandings of happiness over alternatives because of their ability to include
non-human animals in indicators. In that case, it is very likely that qualitative
hedonism, SWB (through the life satisfaction component), and “intellectual”
eudaimonism (e.g., Aristotelian rationalism or virtue ethics) constitute inferior
options in comparison to classical hedonism, subjective emotional state theory,
or “naturalistic” eudaimonism.7 In sum, taking the species issue seriously
impacts on the choice of understanding for building happiness indexes.
The scope question encompasses issues that are central to the measurement of
happiness. Most of the research does not identify the membership scope: indi-
cators are often presented as recording the happiness of everyone on a given
territory without any further analysis of the people included and how they are
represented in a given index. Moreover, future generations and non-human
animals are excluded from current initiatives for developing happiness indexes.
Such exclusions may be seen as morally problematic, which leaves room for
debate in which philosophers have a direct stake.
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3. HOWTO COLLECT THE DATA?
As with any indicator, the construction of happiness indicators raises two sepa-
rate questions: how to collect the data? (Durand and Smith, 2013, pp. 119-130)
and how to build the indicator? The latter covers issues such as the choice
between monetary and non-monetary indexes, the rules of aggregation, the
weighing of the various components in the case of composite indicators, cardi-
nal vs. ordinal measurement, and so forth. Despite its importance, the issue of
how to build indicators is not addressed in these pages. It raises questions of
engineering that that are beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on philo-
sophical and political challenges of happiness indicators, not technical ones. So
this section focuses on the first set of challenges created by the collection of
data.
3.1 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
The two methods for collecting data are objective and subjective reporting. The
distinction can be formulated as being between directly observable and unob-
servable material (Frey, 2008, p. 162). Subjective reporting records data that are
not directly observable from outside like affects, feelings, emotions, sensations,
and so forth. Investigators have no direct access to the raw material (e.g., indi-
viduals’ feelings, emotional states, or satisfaction with life). Objective reporting
tracks the “hard data” such as functioning, capabilities, or flourishing that can
be observed from outside.
The split operates at two levels: the nature of the object under evaluation (plea-
sure, pain, life satisfaction, flourishing, etc.) and the nature of the assessment
(biochemistry, brain waves, hormones, questionnaire, self-report) (Veenhoven,
2002). On the first level, objective assessment focuses on things that exist inde-
pendently of the subject’s mental states, while the subjective is about psycho-
logical states. On the second level, the objective implies external criteria and
observers, whereas the subjective is mostly about self-reporting. There is an
overlap between the two, which should be acknowledged.
Despite these methodological issues, this section outlines the common under-
standing and practices of data collection: subjective reporting refers to an indi-
rect access to happiness, whether that happiness is hedonic, eudaimonic, or
subjective well-being. Information is obtained through self-reports or evalua-
tions. Objective reporting refers to direct measurement of individuals’ happi-
ness through external observation with minimal mediation (which excludes
self-reports and assessments).
3.2 OBJECTIVE REPORTING
Favoured by economists for indicators such as Gross Domestic Product, objec-
tive reporting seems a natural fit for eudaimonic understandings of happiness
based on an objective list. For example, it is possible to calculate a capability
index, inspired by the works of Martha Nussbaum (2010, pp. 110-111), through
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the external observation of the performance of individuals (e.g., Human Devel-
opment Index). A possible criticism is that it is not fine-grained enough for
capturing the complexity of part of human well-being that relates to happiness,
especially the subjective dimension. It does not collect all the information that
matters for evaluating happiness—namely, feelings, emotions, affects, moods,
and satisfaction.
Against this criticism, two counter-arguments can be made in defence of objec-
tive reporting, one negative and one positive. The negative argument is to stress
the difficulties of subjective reporting—e.g., the risk of manipulation or inac-
curacy.8 But this reply is convincing only insofar as it could be proven that the
lack of subjective elements is less of a serious defect than the lack of reliability
of subjective reporting.
The positive argument is that objective reporting can directly access individual
subjective elements. Possible methods include brain waves (Layard, 2005) or
physiological screening (e.g., cortisol, oxytocin). But one may argue that objec-
tive reporting offers only unmediated data, and is therefore only distantly related
to what is supposed to be measured (e.g., affects) because hormonal reactions or
brain waves are different from the subjective states they are correlated with. As
a result, subjective reporting would still be valuable for individual feelings,
affects, satisfaction, or moods. In any case, happiness researchers use only
marginally objective indicators, so there is no need to elaborate.
3.3 SUBJECTIVE REPORTING
Subjective reporting is the most common method for collecting happiness data.
The methodology is to ask individuals about their lives as a whole (life-satis-
faction); specific domains like work, family, social relationships, and so on
(domain-satisfaction); or particular moments, feelings, and emotions (affects).
This method is used by major happiness surveys and indicators, such as the
World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer, and Gallup’s Global Barometer of
Hope and Happiness. Subjective reporting is the method par excellence, espe-
cially for SWB (i.e. positive and negative affects plus individual satisfaction)
(Kashdan et al., 2008, pp. 221-222; Ryan and Deci 2001, p. 144).
There are several ways of collecting individuals’ self-reports depending on the
sort of happiness that is monitored, each of which has specific issues.
a) Affects. Central in hedonia and present in SWB, positive and negative affects
may be measured as experienced or remembered states (Kahneman et al., 1997;
Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). Experienced states are measured “on the spot,”
at the very moment individuals experience specific activities or situations. Meas-
uring experienced happiness (or utility in Kahneman language, which is derived
from the Benthamian view that equates utility with the total aggregate of pleas-
ure and pain) is complex and demanding since individuals must be prompted
while they carry on their daily activities.
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The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is a method for measuring experienced
mental states (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Participants are equipped with electronic
devices that regularly require them to enter information on their affective and
emotional states (elated, bored, stressed, angry, etc.) and on the kind of activity
they are currently undertaking, and other information (e.g., the time when the
activity started). The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) is an alternative
method for tracking remembered happiness (utility). Participants have to keep
a diary of their daily activities (Kahneman et al., 2004b), report information such
as the kind of activities they undertook, the length of each activity, the affects,
feelings, or emotions experienced during these activities, and so on.
The choice between experienced and remembered utility is a trade-off between
practicability and accuracy. Studies in psychology have shown that individuals
make mistakes when they recall past events, especially when they try to recol-
lect mental states and emotions (Gilbert, 2006). As shown by Kahneman et al.
(1997), remembered utility substantially diverges from experienced utility
(understood as instant utility).9 When individuals are asked to recall specific
events and what their affects were at those moments, they average the peak affect
(i.e., the most intense moment) with the affect at the end of the event. The so-
called peak-end rule produces hedonic accounts that diverge from experienced
utility, especially when understood as the integral of the intensity and length of
affects.10This alteration is due to the combined effect of judgment and memory.
A psychometric method such as ESM reduces the noise inherent to self-report-
ing, but it suffers from a practical shortcoming: it is very demanding for the
respondents and costly to implement. Proponents willingly acknowledge that
this method is not fit for large-scale indicators (Kahneman et al., 2004a, p. 431).
The alternative, DRM, does not interrupt individuals in their activities and
reduces implementation costs, but re-introduces significant noise due to the time
gap between the experience and the individual report. In addition to the effect
of the delay, individuals, consciously or not, filter out their experiences, produc-
ing distorted accounts.
b) Self-evaluations and judgments. Self-evaluative and judgmental components
are usually collected through questionnaires where individuals are asked to situ-
ate their happiness (or satisfaction) on a scale. A popular method is the Cantril
self-anchoring scale (e.g., Gallup) where individuals are asked to imagine the
best possible world and to weigh their actual life against it. Other methods
include life satisfaction questions (“On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”) and
happiness questions (“Taking all things together, would you say you are very
happy, rather happy, not very happy or not at all happy?”) that are part of numer-
ous indicators like the Eurobarometer, the Gallup World Poll, and the World
Values Survey.
While the mediation of individual self-assessment, i.e. a person’s evaluation of
his or her own situation, is a problem for monitoring affective states, it is
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precisely what is tracked by evaluative components: how individuals judge their
life as a whole or by domains (e.g. work, family, personal relations). Self-assess-
ments therefore offer a weighted picture of life: when individuals express how
satisfied they are with their life, work, family, etc., they elaborate on their objec-
tive situation by taking into account subjective elements such as life goals, moral
or religious values, etc. By doing so, they produce a weighted judgment, a re-
construction of how their life or parts of it is going from their own point of view.
However, self-reports of life satisfaction may be more prone to biases than
affects because they are constructed judgments. But techniques are available for
making self-reports more robust (Diener, 1994). Also, circumstances under
which questionnaires are administered influence responses (Diener, 2000, p. 35;
Kahneman et al., 2004a, p. 430). Respondents may have distorted views on how
their life is going (Gilbert, 2006). They might also distort their self-reports for
various reasons: they may be under the sway of social conventions (e.g., in
regard to the expression of personal satisfaction) or have various psychological
motives (e.g., to appear in a better light in the eyes of the investigator).
c) Functioning and flourishing. The last category is eudaimonic happiness. Even
if objective reporting is important for monitoring eudaimonia, especially for
objective list theories, subjective methods are used too. For instance, the Person-
ally ExpressiveActivities Questionnaire is made up of a series of questions about
a given activity that concentrate on factors that contribute to feelings of flour-
ishing, accomplishment, or completeness (Waterman, 2008, p. 236). Another
example is Psychological Well-Being: respondents are asked to rate their level
of disagreement/agreement in regard to statements covering six eudaimonic
domains (self-acceptance, environmental mastery, positive relations, purpose in
life, personal growth, autonomy) (Ryff and Keyes, 1995).
In both surveys (as for other eudaimonic monitoring tools), respondents are
asked to provide a self-evaluation. As phrased by Julia Annas and Corey Keyes
(2009, p. 198) “our measures of well-being reflect individual’s judgments of
their functioning in life.” For the Psychological Well-Being, they evaluate their
own functioning across several areas generally. For the Personally Expressive
Activities Questionnaire, they evaluate their more limited eudaimonic experi-
ence during a given activity. The methodology is so close to the one used for self-
evaluation and judgments that we will not go any further and will now consider
criticisms against subjective reporting.
3.4 OBJECTIONS
Whether subjective reporting is used for monitoring affects, life satisfaction, or
eudaimonia, it needs to reply to two objections.
The first is the adequacy of the measured object to capture happiness: to what
extent is the measured thing really happiness? It can be asked whether experi-
enced utility, remembered utility, life-satisfaction, or personal expressiveness
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reflects true happiness. Eudaimonists may argue that experienced and remem-
bered utilities offer a measure of emotions that has nothing to do with “true”
happiness understood as human flourishing or functioning. Hedonists may reply
that personal expressiveness, life-satisfaction, and other evaluative components
track individual qualities such as a person’s self-reflective capacities or judg-
ment on his or her situation that are not related to happiness.
To be fully convincing, these criticisms ought to prove that happiness indica-
tors based on hedonia, eudaimonia, or SWB (depending on the point of view of
the critique) do not overlap with some shared understanding of happiness or folk
conception. Since it is reasonable to consider that affective and evaluative
components capture different dimensions that a significant number of individu-
als identify with happiness, it is difficult to argue that to measure experienced
utility, remembered utility, life satisfaction, flourishing, or any other hedo-
nic/eudaimonic/SWB concept is to measure something other than happiness
from people’s own point of view.
The second objection tackles the reliability of the measurement.Affective states
as well as evaluative judgments may (or not) be components of happiness. The
quarrel is not about this. The criticism is that researchers use tools that do not
offer reliable accounts of these components. At first sight, the objection is
supported by psychological findings from happiness research itself. As Kahne-
man et al. (2004a, p. 430) put it, “the life satisfaction and happiness questions
that are used in well-being research request the type of global assessment that
people perform poorly on in the psychological laboratory.” Academics such as
Daniel Kahneman (2011) and Daniel Gilbert (2006) have built part of their
careers on this idea of individual insufficiency. Thus if we consider that indi-
vidual rationality is bounded, that individuals suffer from cognitive biases, that
they adopt (flawed) heuristics, and that they have trouble correctly remember-
ing what made them happy (Gilbert and Wilson, 2000), how can subjective
reporting be trusted (Landes 2013)?
It may be argued that two reasons make it difficult to disregard subjective report-
ing. First, these measures have something to do with happiness even in a loose
sense. They record emotions, affects, evaluations, and judgments that matter for
individuals who experience them (the folk conception of happiness). When an
individual rates a given experience as painful or pleasurable, that individual
positively or negatively values an episode of his or her life on affective grounds.
When that individual reports being satisfied or dissatisfied, he or she positively
or negatively values how his or her life is going. Self-assessment of satisfac-
tion, feelings, etc., even partly mistaken, still expresses something of value: indi-
vidual experience. In other words, one’s judgments about one’s own affects or
satisfaction have some prudential value.
Secondly, personal authority in regard to one’s own welfare forces us to take
seriously individual affective or evaluative self-assessments, even if they do not
accurately track happiness as a complex of feelings/emotions or an informed
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judgment on one’s own situation. This second reason is not epistemic. It does-
n’t imply or require that individual statements perfectly reflect a person’s well-
being with a perfect, or even high, degree of accuracy. The bottom line is that
individual statements cannot be overridden qua expressions of an authoritative
agent without further qualification (e.g., impaired judgment).11 It is a question of
principle.
The reliability objection is not a knockout argument. First of all, it suggests that
more accurate monitoring tools are needed, not that we should give up on meas-
uring happiness. An analogy with inequality is illustrative: because the Gini
coefficient is an imperfect snapshot of income inequalities, it does not imply
that it is worthless. In that respect, such imperfections argue in favour of improv-
ing or supplementing the Gini coefficient, not dropping it. The same goes for
happiness indicators. Instruments like ESM or DRM represent improvements
in the measurement of hedonic states when compared to retrospective evalua-
tions. In addition to forging better tools, one way of addressing reliability is to
diversify the components of the indicators (the diversification/hybridization
strategy) and/or to assess happiness measurements through the correlation with
other indicators such as brainwaves, blood pressure, physiological monitoring,
etc. (Frank, 1988; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Kahneman et al., 1997; Layard,
2005).
4.WHAT TO DO?
Happiness indexes are assumed to have two qualities, especially those based on
subjective reporting. They promote more encompassing views on welfare and
they provide a picture of human welfare that is closer to what actually matters
for individuals than most common alternatives like GDP. In addition, they are
tools for monitoring the evolution of happiness and well-being in a given coun-
try, as well as differences across various groups within a country or across coun-
tries (as long as the questions are understood in the same manner in the countries
compared).
From the perspective of political philosophy, the use of happiness indicators by
public institutions raises numerous challenges. So far this article has addressed
those related to the identification of a conception of happiness, the choice of a
population to be monitored, and the collection of data. There are further issues
that are about the institutional use of indicators. Happiness indicators are subject
to four criticisms: uselessness, manipulation, capture, and non-neutrality. These
four objections derive from the previous methodological points. The purpose of
this last section is to present an encompassing view of the objections to attempts
to use happiness indicators for public decision-making. This section also gives
an overview of the possible replies to these objections.
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4.1 THE USELESSNESS OBJECTION
Happiness indicators are worthless for public policy for different reasons.
a) Happiness indicators are useless because the results cannot be compared,
especially at the international level. The inability to compare the results may
stem from the fact that individuals understand questions about happiness differ-
ently 12 or from the fact that they hold different understandings of happiness. As
a result, individual responses will be poorly informative:
Many of measures still leave a lot to be desired. Probably the least
useful are the surveys that simply ask people to say how ‘happy’ they
are. Since people interpret the word ‘happy’ differently, different
respondents will effectively be answering different questions.
(Haybron, 2013, p. 44)
Three replies are possible. The first one is to concede the lack of comparability
only for international comparisons. National indicators are still useful for longi-
tudinal evaluations since they monitor a population that, except under dramatic
circumstances such as war, massive emigration, or genocide, keeps a relatively
stable composition. This continuity gives an opportunity for identifying signif-
icant variations in happiness because the biases presumably remain constant
through time if the population remains the same.
A second reply is to underline that evaluative components of happiness and SWB
are more likely to depend on cultural norms than affective/emotional ones
(Vazquez and Hervas, 2013, p. 32). There is still room for international compar-
isons, at least by using hedonic components such as affects and reducing the
weight of evaluative dimensions.
The last counter-argument is to engage with the premise of the argument by
pointing out that it is based on too radical a view of pluralism according to which
moral or cultural differences are so profound that it will generate insurmountable
incommensurability. If it is right that people may understand questions differ-
ently or give different weight to different components, it is still possible to
compare groups of people from different cultural backgrounds by adjusting or
correcting the data or by analyzing these differences. Finally, it should be noted
that cultural differences are often exaggerated.
b) Happiness indicators are useless because individuals quickly adapt to
changes in life circumstances (Frey, 2008, pp. 164-165). This is the most contro-
versial finding of the literature stemming from the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin,
1995).13 Also, a study (now contested) suggested that lottery winners and newly
tetraplegics rapidly adapt to their new situations, almost returning to their level
of happiness before the lottery gain or the accident that caused the handicap
(Brickman et al., 1978). Thus, aspiration and hedonic treadmills will render
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happiness indicators poor in useful information. Moreover, public policies
grounded on such information would be ‘Sisyphus policies’ that pursue impos-
sible social improvements since happiness would be fated to return to its long-
term level.
The criticism is based on the premise that individuals fully adapt to changes in
their life conditions and concludes that no public policy can have a lasting effect
on collective happiness. But the amplitude of individual adaptation has been
exaggerated by initial studies (e.g., on tetraplegics and lottery winners): indi-
viduals do not completely adjust to life changes, especially when changes are
non-pecuniary (Easterlin, 2003). In addition, indicators may still record short-
term variations in happiness levels—i.e., before adaptation. Moreover, the differ-
ent dimensions of happiness (affects, self-assessment, etc.) or understandings
(affective, evaluative, etc.) adapt differently depending on the kind of changes
in a person’s life circumstances (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006, pp. 9-14). As a
result, happiness indexes can still be useful for identifying potential social
reforms.
c) Happiness indicators are useless because the pursuit of happiness makes
sense only at the individual level. The criticism is that happiness does not pose
any particular problem as a personal goal, but does as a political one. There is a
practical or/and normative gap that cannot be overcome, between the value of
happiness in personal life and its political pursuit (Duncan, 2010, pp. 172-173;
Landes 2013).
From a practical point of view, individuals hold so many different understand-
ings of happiness that there cannot be such a thing as public happiness. Conse-
quently, the usefulness of happiness indicators is limited. From a normative point
of view, individuals hold so many different understandings of happiness that the
state should not enact politics of happiness. Echoing Rawls’s objections to the
separateness and sacrifice of the minority (Rawls, 1971, pp. 26-27), the risk is
that public happiness will impinge on individuals who hold original, marginal,
minority views on happiness. Consequently, it undermines more than the useful-
ness of happiness indicators: it undermines its moral desirability.
Such criticisms are relevant only insofar as institutions intend to use happiness
indexes for maximization purposes (such as Bentham’s felicific calculus). But
this is not necessarily the case.As a matter of fact, happiness indicators are often
viewed by researchers and decision makers as not having the final say on human
welfare. Indicators may be used only as part of more general socioeconomic
feedback on the state of the population. They can serve to spot vulnerable groups
within the society that could not be identified otherwise (i.e., through traditional
socioeconomic indicators) (Stiglitz et al., 2009, pp. 10-11). They can also serve
to monitor the evolution of a given population or to compare different groups
within a given population. They may be used by entities that are not directly
involved in public decision making—e.g., advocacy groups or non-profit organ-
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izations. Even if individuals do not share the same conception of happiness,
happiness differentials among groups or the evolution through time of the happi-
ness of specific groups may still be a valuable source of information for institu-
tions and various organisations.
To summarize, the pursuit of public happiness is not the only reason institutions
want to measure it. They may use indicators as complements of other decision-
making tools (as recommended by the Stiglitz-Sen Commission) that assess
other dimensions of welfare (some unrelated to happiness) and for the sole sake
of having a more finely tuned image of vulnerability. Thus, the objection is a non
sequitur: it is not because the pursuit of happiness could only make sense at the
individual level that happiness indicators are necessarily useless.
d) The final criticism is that happiness indicators are useless because they try to
quantify something that should not be. The criticism is sometimes made as part
of a more general point against the contemporary obsession with accounting for
any dimension of human life (Jany-Catrice, 2012). The problem with happiness
indicators is that they try to quantify segments of human experience that should
not be quantified. There is a risk that the happiness determinants (e.g., family,
friends, personality traits, etc.) and understandings (hedonia, eudaimonia, SWB)
will be reduced to things, objects, and, as a result, happiness will lose what
makes it valuable in individual lives.
Against this criticism, it can be said that, first, it is difficult to determine in what
sense evaluating dimensions of life and compiling data to form indicators leads
to reification. That criticism could be made against all public policy tools that
rely on evaluation and aggregation (e.g., unemployment, violence, birth rates).
Due to its radical premise and implications, the last criticism may not be
addressed here in a way that could be judged satisfactory by those who argue for
it. But, there is also not so much to discuss since the objection tackles the justi-
fication for having any index at first place.
4.2 THE MANIPULATION OBJECTION
Happiness indicators may be manipulated to serve certain interests (Frey, 2008,
pp. 166-167). Subjective reporting, at the core of most initiatives for building
indexes, facilitates such manipulation.
Different agents may manipulate happiness indicators: individuals, public insti-
tutions, and political parties. Especially when happiness is the focus of public
policies (Frey and Gallus, 2013, p. 4206), citizens may alter their self-reports in
order to punish the government. Subjective reporting facilitates manipulation
because there is no “fundamental” (i.e., easily accessible background facts, the
“raw material”) against which to check the collected information. Also, institu-
tions may manipulate indicators by diverse means: legal, legal but morally prob-
lematic, and illegal (like increased and/or targeted public spending, propaganda,
creative accounting, and so forth) (Frey and Gallus, 2013, pp. 4207-4209).
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Happiness indicators will be more easily manipulated than other indexes based
on objective data such as GDP or HDI (Frey and Gallus, 2012, pp. 103-104).
Finally political parties might “cook the facts” by misinterpreting or perverting
the data provided by indicators (De Prycker, 2010, p. 595). If this is an issue
(and as such problematic, whether they are about happiness or other data), it
says nothing about the indicators per se since the manipulation happens ex post,
on already gathered and analyzed data.
One counter-argument is to point out that so-called objective indicators can be
manipulated too. GDP, inflation, and public debt for instance are, qua objective
measures, assumed to be more verifiable and therefore less easy to “cook,” but
as a matter of fact they have been repeatedly falsified (e.g., the 2010 Greek
public finances scandal). As expressed by Derek Bok (2010, p. 40), “in light of
these weaknesses, the results of happiness studies seem, if anything, more reli-
able than many familiar statistics and other types of evidence that legislators
and administration officials routinely use in making policy.” Of course this
counter-argument does not make the case for happiness indicators based on
subjective reporting. Rather it suggests that the distinction between objective
and subjective indicators is not one between indicators that can be manipulated
and those that cannot be manipulated. Both types can be bent to specific ends.
A reply to this counter-argument is to emphasize the relative advantage of indi-
cators based on objective reporting in comparison to those based on subjective
reporting. The reply agrees that both types of indicators can be manipulated, but
affirms that it is easier to twist the latter. Moreover, agents have incentives to do
so. Governments have incentives to give more weight to particular happiness
indicators and to try to talk down others; respondents can easily alter their self-
assessments depending on their intention.
It might be possible to agree with the spirit of this reply but still believe that
manipulation can be significantly reduced by various tactics. (While all address
governmental manipulation, only the first is effective for preventing the alter-
ation of self-reports by respondents.) First, happiness indicators might incorpo-
rate more objective reporting such as brain waves, biochemical activity, and so
forth. This data can be used for building indicators that will be teamed up with
subjective indicators for producing more encompassing measurements. Or this
data can be directly incorporated into existing indicators for building compos-
ite indicators.
Secondly, the responsibility for collecting data and building indicators may be
delegated to independent organizations, as it is already the case for central banks
for inflation (Frey and Gallus, 2012, p. 108) or national statistics institutes. There
are several ways for preserving the independence of these institutions. One is to
set up constitutional and legal provisions that guarantee independence, such as
for the European Central Bank.
Finally, the number of happiness indicators may be multiplied in order to diver-
sify the sources that inform public policies and render manipulation more diffi-
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cult to undertake or more visible when undertaken. This argument may be
supported by a consequentialist argument that emphasizes the virtue of a diver-
sity of opinions for resisting propaganda. In other words, a diversity of happi-
ness indicators will reduce the risk of manipulation, but also will enhance public
information and democratic debates. To conclude, the three tactics illustrate the
potential of diversification/hybridization measures for meeting the manipula-
tion objection.
4.3 THE CAPTURE OBJECTION
Happiness indicators give too much power to experts in the political decision-
making process.
If public policies are based on happiness indicators, governance will be captured
by experts and will ultimately lead to a “government of the experts.” Such
capture will be accentuated by the degree of complexity of happiness indica-
tors.
However, it is difficult to see how happiness indicators are or could be much
more complex than other indicators routinely used for political decision-making
(e.g., GDP, Human Development Index, Gini coefficient, balance of trade). If the
capture of the decision-making process is a legitimate source of worry and if
complexity is what grounds this worry, many dimensions of decision making in
modern societies must raise identical concerns. Thus this objection is not so much
against happiness indicators per se than against indicators as governance tools.
A counter-argument is to underscore that public institutions could provide exten-
sive information on the construction of such indexes. By being completely trans-
parent about the data and methodology used, they may reduce the role of experts
as the hermeneutists of happiness indicators. Transparency could then serve as a
safeguard against attempts to capture the decision-making process (and inciden-
tally against the manipulation objection). In conclusion, the worry about the
capture of democratic processes is legitimate, but it does not justify a rejection of
happiness indicators (if it did, opinion polls would also be problematic). To the
contrary, it advocates for finding instruments and processes that reduce this risk.
4.4 THE NON-NEUTRALITY OBJECTION
Happiness indicators promote specific moral, political, or cultural norms.
This objection is the immediate consequence of the methodological choices
imposed by the construction of happiness indexes. Since different understand-
ings of happiness do not account for the same aspects of human life, happiness
indicators are bound to offer partial views on human well-being depending on
the understanding chosen. Furthermore, public policies based on them express
this moral and political partiality. As a result, moral, cultural, religious, or
specialist doctrines are favoured at the expense of others, which undermines the
ideal of state neutrality in regard to axiological diversity.
26
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
0
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
5
a) The first counter-argument is to claim that happiness indicators are neutral, so
there is no risk of violating the principle of neutrality. This response is articulated
by Ed Diener and Martin Seligman when they write that they “believe that meas-
ures of well-being are—and must be—exactly as neutral politically as are
economic indicators” before adding that such measures are “descriptive, not
prescriptive, and should remain so” (Diener and Seligman, 2004, p. 24).
However, it is unclear in what sense happiness measures are politically neutral
“as economic indicators are.” First of all, if Diener and Seligman are right in
the sense that SWB measures, for example, do not contain an ought, it is still a
far cry from guaranteeing political neutrality, especially politically neutral use.
They are other ways to be non-neutral than by explicitly endorsing or promot-
ing political (or moral, religious, cultural) views. As seen above, the choice of a
conception of happiness for building an indicator is non-neutral in a double
sense: it indicates that the architects of the indicator have chosen an under-
standing of happiness over alternatives (but without explicitly endorsing it) and
it provides a measuring tool focused on specific dimensions or understandings
of happiness at the expense of alternatives.
b) A second counter-argument is to challenge the interpretation of the ideal of
neutrality as requiring fully neutral political decisions. It may be argued that no
one ever seriously defends the principle of completely neutral public policies.
Neutrality matters as a question of degree—i.e., that it is preferable to have poli-
cies that are as neutral as possible (Dworkin, 1985, p. 191). Therefore, any rebut-
tal of happiness indicators rooted on their lack of neutrality may rely on too
radical and, therefore, too indefensible a view. The crux of the objection is to ask
what could be wrong about the fact that happiness indicators may favour specific
conceptions of the good life. In other words, non-neutrality in itself is insufficient
for proving that there is a moral issue.
As a reply to the second counter-argument, it could be contended that the neutral-
ity issue is still pertinent. The utopian nature of a full-blooded ideal of neutral-
ity may be acknowledged, but there is still the question of how much
non-neutrality to accept. Since the idea of public institutions oppressively
promoting a particular conception of the good life will (presumably) appear
problematic to most citizens, there is a need to define the conditions for accept-
able non-neutral decisions. It could be argued that happiness indicators cross
this line because they influence public policies (through feedback) in a direction
that advantages some individuals to the detriment of others, without a morally
valid reason.
c) A third counter-argument is to recognize the lack of neutrality of happiness
indicators and to accept the fact that it may be problematic, but to limit the diver-
gence from the ideal through a “strategy of diversification/hybridization,” either
internal or external.
Internal diversification is about diversifying the constituents of happiness indi-
cators in order to cover the broadest possible spectrum of happiness under-
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standings through, for instance, the inclusion of positive and negative affects,
moods, life-satisfaction, domains-satisfaction, functioning, and so forth (Diener,
2000, pp. 35, 40; Vazquez and Hervas, 2013, p. 39). A further step could be to
allow respondents to rate the importance of the diverse constituents of the indi-
cator when their responses are collected.
External diversification can be enabled by, as already mentioned, allowing inde-
pendent actors to develop their own happiness indexes and taking them into
account for political decision-making. As such, the diversity of views on happi-
ness will be accounted for from various perspectives and through various indi-
cators. Consequently, public decision making will be made more pluralistic (Frey
and Gallus, 2012, p. 108).
CONCLUSION
The previous pages have shown that happiness indicators raise issues related to
the conception of happiness on which they operate, their internal construction,
and the ways in which they are used. In addition, the specific issues raised by
happiness indicators have been presented systematically and discussed, and tack-
led one by one. It should be noted that this article was neither an endorsement
of happiness indicators nor a rebuttal of the possibility of measuring happiness.
Instead, the purpose was to identify philosophical and political challenges of
happiness indicators and to try answering them in good faith—i.e., by taking
happiness research seriously.
From a bird’s eye view, three encompassing issues present an immediate inter-
est for political philosophers and normative thinkers in public ethics. I would like
to conclude this article by succinctly presenting them.
Firstly, the adequate balance among understandings of happiness within
hybridized-diversified indicators opens up research avenues for political philoso-
phers. In short, how to weight hedonic, eudaimonic, or SWB components within
a single indicator? Or, how to balance different indicators (tracking hedonic,
eudaimonic, or SWB components) within a given decision-making process?An
easy answer is to consider that the appropriate balance is different depending
on the indicator, context, institution in charge, and political aim. The answer
might appear too simplistic, but the devil is in the detail. Arguably one of the
tasks of applied political philosophy could be to look into such details to depart
from the over-generality and lack of specificity that often characterizes discus-
sions on happiness measurement.
Secondly, there are institutional and democratic issues: how should these indi-
cators be handled in liberal democracies? Various sub-questions emerge. For
instance, there is the question of the distribution of the responsibility for admin-
istrating these indicators: who should be in charge? In a democracy the choice
of the institutions, public and private, that provides the information and neces-
sary feedback for political decision making is never trivial for reasons evoked
in this article (e.g., risks of manipulation, capture, involvement of citizens).
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A related question is: how should such responsibility be exercised by the insti-
tutions (private or public) in charge? In other words, the mandate of these insti-
tutions, when they build happiness indicators, needs to be defined. Behind these
issues, there is one that is much more fundamental and that relates to the public
status of happiness. Public institutions need to be clear about the role played by
happiness in the more general framework of quality of life. They ought to artic-
ulate the new data that will be provided by these emerging indicators with more
classical measurements. They also need to determine the importance they place
on happiness as a political goal.
This means that there are further reflections to carry out on happiness as a polit-
ical value (among other values). This also means that an underlying institutional
theory of happiness and well-being indicators is required. Political theorists and
normative thinkers may have a stake in contributing (more than they currently
do) to the debates about the public value happiness of course, but also about the
institutional implementation of such value. For instance, one of the tasks of this
institutional twist is probably to determine the adequate degree of transparency
of happiness indicators or the value of happiness arguments in specific debates
(e.g., on unemployment, climatic change, work environment, social policies).
Last but not least, there are issues of inclusion: how should these indicators be
handled in pluralistic liberal democracies? If we consider that democratic strug-
gles have often been about ending the exclusion of particular individuals or
groups from the decision-making process, as well as taking into account their
interests and welfare, happiness indicators raise issues in this dimension too.
The second section (whom to include?) echoes this of course, but not only that.
Transparency issues illustrate this challenge of better inclusion of citizens in
public decision-making processes. Moreover, it could be argued that due to their
subjective nature and their multidimensional aspects (feelings, functioning, life
satisfaction, etc.), happiness indicators require the inclusion of all stakeholders
(citizens, non-citizens, and animals) much more than traditional indicators like
GDP.
In conclusion, if it is accepted that institutions have a responsibility to design
public policies that enhance the quality of life of their citizens (partly captured
by happiness indicators), and if the pluralistic nature of happiness is acknowl-
edged as a legitimate constraint, political philosophers and normative thinkers
have to discuss the diversification-hybridization strategy. If the idea is taken
seriously that individuals hold divergent views on the determinants and the
“true” nature of happiness, the creation of indexes capable of accounting for
such plurality is either morally or strategically necessary. Furthermore, the inclu-
sion of stakeholders appears to be necessary too.
Happiness indicators should be at the core of both public debates and academic
research. The need for such a debate is reinforced by three trends. The first is the
rising concern about traditional indicators of welfare such as GDP and the harsh
criticisms that they are attracting in a situation of environmental and economic
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crisis. The second is the necessary reforms the world is facing for addressing
global issues such as climate change, depletion of natural resources, and anemic
economic growth, which implies, if not completely changing, then at least
amending political goals, economic structures, and so forth. The last trend is the
current momentum enjoyed by happiness measurement (J. Helliwell et al.,
2013). As specialists of political design, political philosophers have a “natural”
competence for being more present in these debates that they currently are.
For these reasons, as well as the increased interest from psychologists, sociolo-
gists, and political theorists, normative thinkers should pay more attention to the
issues related to the construction and political use of these new indicators, which
includes happiness ones. As stated, there is a “natural” fit for political philoso-
phers and normative thinkers because these issues intersect with themes that
have always been utterly important for philosophy like pluralism, democracy,
and inclusion, as well as themes that benefit from a growing interest in the
profession, like institutional design and social architecture.
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NOTES
1 For the reason why understandings is used instead of concepts or conceptions, see below
section 1.2.
2 In short, the Easterlin Paradox, or Happiness Paradox, stipulates that material affluence does
not make societies happier over time.
3 Few analyses pave the way to this present article (Sharpe, 1999).
4 To be exhaustive, mood and emotional-state theories should be mentioned (Haybron, 2013).
But we focus here on the key players in the discussions regarding happiness indicators, and
mood theories are, for the moment, marginal in philosophy, psychology, and other social
sciences.
5 Todd Kashdan et al. (2008, p. 224) consider that there are some significant overlaps between
eudaimonia and SWB. Moreover, various authors defend the idea that SWB is flexible enough
to integrate much more the eudaimonic dimension (Deci and Ryan, 2008, p. 2).
6 Happiness ‘monists’ may still find this reply unsatisfactory since the problem, according to
them, is focusing on the appropriate understanding of happiness, not accommodating as many
understandings as possible.
7 “Intellectual eudaimonism” encompasses all interpretations of the eudaimon (the “true self”)
as depending on the flourishing of higher rational or moral abilities, whereas “naturalistic
eudaimonism” identifies the eudaimonwith the fulfilment of one’s nature, no matter what this
nature could be. According to the latter, a plant, a fish, or an ox can be eudaimon.
8 In support of the criticism, it is widely recognized that individual self-reports of life satisfac-
tion and happiness are influenced by irrelevant factors: e.g., the order of questions in the ques-
tionnaire, the circumstances under which the questionnaire is administered (Diener, 2000,
p. 35). Such discrepancies may be due to the manipulation of respondents’ moods, the mani-
pulation of the context, interpersonal comparisons, and comparisons with past experience
(Kahneman et al., 2004a, p. 430).
9 Experienced utility represents the utility as felt on the spot by the respondent, whereas remem-
bered utility is the utility as recalled by the respondent. However, Kahneman sometimes gath-
ers under the umbrella of experienced utility both instant utility (previous experienced utility)
and remembered utility. This all-encompassing concept of experienced utility is used in
contrast to both decision utility—used, for instance, in game theory—and predicted utility
(Kahneman et al., 1997).
10 Kahneman’s position is not crystal-clear. He seems to pursue two different agendas in regard
to ‘experienced’ (or ‘instant’) utility. On the one hand, he tries to provide the most solid empir-
ical account of Benthamian utility—namely, experienced utility. But, on the other hand, he also
seems to advocate for ‘experienced’ (or ‘instant’ utility) as the “true” happiness. This ambi-
guity explains why, while he claims that his objective is only methodological (i.e., to frame
the most solid account for Benthamian happiness) (Kahneman et al., 1997, p. 377), he is crit-
icized for endorsing ‘experienced’ (or ‘instant’) utility as the proper view on happiness or
well-being (Alexandrova, 2005).
11 Haybron (2010, pp. 11-14) criticizes the postulate of individual authority.
12 Solutions to the issue of the disparity among the interpretations of index components have
been advanced. For instance, Daniel Kahneman and Alan Krueger propose the inclusion of a
‘U Index’ (‘misery index’) as a response to the fact that individuals may interpret the categories
of life-satisfaction inquiries differently (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006, pp. 18-19).
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13 The Easterlin Paradox states that 1) in a given country, happiness (understood as life satis-
faction) is correlated with wealth, 2) in cross-country comparisons, happiness is correlated to
income until a certain point, after which happiness stagnates, and 3) longitudinal studies do
not show any increase in average happiness in several countries over several decades (e.g.,
Japan, United States).
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